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Kasold: Toward a Definition of the Bona Fide Seniority System

TOWARD DEFINITION OF THE BONA FIDE

SENIORITY SYSTEM
BRucE E. KASOLD*
INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act) is the most comprehensive legislation banning employment discrimination.' Section 703 of the
Act prohibits certain discriminatory employment practices by employers and
labor organizations.2 The prohibitions in section 703 are modified, however,
by section 703(h), which permits "different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system... provided
"3
such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate. ....
The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted this Title VII immunity for
seniority systems. 4 However, as the Court has yet to define what constitutes a
"bona fide" seniority system, the litigation often focuses on whether a given
seniority system is bona fide. This artidcle attempts to give meaning to the
amorphous term, bona fide. The first part of the article explores the Supreme
Court's insistence on giving seniority systems broad Title VII immunity. The
latter section will pursue a framework for evaluating whether a particular
seniority system is bona fide, and thus immune from attack under Title VII.
DISCRIMINATION UNDER

TrrLE VII

The Supreme Court has fostered broad Title VII immunity for seniority
systems in two ways. First, the Court has extended immunity to discrimination
practices that occurred before as well as after the Act and, second, the Court
has taken an expansive view of what constitutes a "seniority system." Before
*.S.,
United States Military Academy, 1973; J.D., University of Florida, 1979; LL.M.,
Georgetown University, 1982.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701-18 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1976 &
Supp. II 1978)). The Civil Rights Acts of 1866, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1987, 1989, 1992 (1976)) and 1871, Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-86 (1976), have been held to prohibit discrimination in employment

situations. These Acts, however, are only applicable when there has been action under color
of state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), discrimination based on race, id. § 1981, or a conspiracy,
id. §§ 1985-86.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). See also infra text accompanying note 18.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). By preserving seniority systems with discriminatory effect
but without discriminatory intent, § 703(h) helped assure enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. There was considerable opposition to the Act prior to its passage. Section 703(h)'s protection for employers relying on seniority systems helped overcome some of the resistance.
See Kovarsky, Current Remedies for the Discriminatory Effects of Seniority Agreements, 24
VAND. L. Rav. 688, 689 (1971).
4. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 481 U.S. 324 (1977) (bona fide
seniority system not unlawful solely because of perpetuation of pre-Title VII discrimination);
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S.Ct. 1534 (1982) (post-Title VII seniority system
immune).
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analyzing these two developments, it is helpful to consider the plaintiff's burden
in attacking a seniority system under Title VII, which is not protected by section
703(h).
Establishing Seniority System Discrimination
The attack on seniority systems as discriminatory under Title VII can be
largely categorized into two areas, disparate impact and perpetuation of past
discrimination. 5 In 1971, the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
held that Title VII prohibited employment practices with a disparate impact
upon minorities that were not justified by business necessity.7 In Griggs, the
requirement that an employee have a high school diploma resulted in a significantly higher proportion of blacks being disqualified than whites. The needs
of the business were held insufficient to justify the disparate impact of this
diploma requirement.
The burden of proof in disparate impact cases was further defined in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 8 The Supreme Court established that the
plaintiff must initially show the practice in question results in a disparate impact upon the protected class and that the plaintiff is a member of this
protected class. The employer must then meet the burden of showing the
practice is a business necessity. Finally, if the employer meets this burden, the
plaintiff can show that other practices, without disparate discriminatory effect,
"would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship." Under the method of analysis in Griggs and Albemarle,
implementation of a seniority system resulting in a significantly higher proportion of members of a protected class being laid off, not promoted, not recalled, or otherwise adversely affected would be a violation of Title VII,1o
unless it qualifies as a business necessity or as a bona fide seniority system under
section 703(h).1
5.

Two other categories are "disparate treatment" and "failure to make reasonable

accommodation to an employee's religious observance and practices." B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION L.AW 1 (1976). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (distinguishing claims of disparate impact from
claims of disparate treatment).
6. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7. Id. at 432. Griggs did not clearly define business necessity. Dictum suggested that the
employment practice must "be selated to job performance." Id. at 431. The Court, however,
also stated the practice "must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."
Id. at 432. Subsequent cases have not clarified the degree to which the practice must relate to
the job. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975); Equal Employment
Opportunity v. Ball Corp., 661 F.2d 531, 540-41 (6th Cir. 1981) (lunch policy, which had a
disparate impact on women, had a high correlation to performance requirement of production workers and finishers and was thus justified business necessity).
8. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
9. Id. at 425.
10. Seniority systems have generally been attacked because they perpetuate the effects of
prior discrimination. See infra text accompanying notes 12-17. However, the Supreme Court
has clearly indicated that a seniority system is also subject to attack under a straight disparate
impact theory. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1784 (1982); American
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1535 (1982).
11. Teamsters theoretically made the business necessity test obsolete in seniority system
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Several years prior to Griggs, a different attack on seniority systems developed. In the seminal case, Quarlesv. Philip Morris, Inc.,12 black employees
were discriminatorily segregated into the lower paying, undesirable departments
at the time of their initial employment. The initial discrimination did not
violate Title VII because it occurred prior to the passage of the Act. However,
the black employees were effectively prohibited from transferring into a
different department because all seniority, as well as job security, was determined by the length of time an employee had been in a department. The
district court concluded that the seniority system perpetuated the earlier discrimination in violation of Title VII."
Despite broad acceptance of the perpetuation theory of discrimination by
the lower courts,1 4 the Supreme Court has never clearly accepted it. The Court
has expressed concern that allowing the perpetuation theory to obtain would
circumvent the statute of limitations by permitting plaintiffs to substitute a
claim for seniority credit for almost all stale discrimination claims.15 Several
years ago, this resulted in an apparent demise of the perpetuation theory altogether."0 The Supreme Court has recently stated, however, that under the
Griggs analysis Title VII is violated if an employment practice perpetuates the
effects of prior discrimination."7 Accordingly, it appears seniority systems can
be attacked either under a disparate impact theory or under the theory that it
perpetuates prior discrimination.
cases. If the system is within § 703(h), it should not matter whether the system is a business
necessity. If the system is not protected by § 703(h) it probably could not survive a business
necessity evaluation. In practice, the business necessity test has been little used since the landmark Teamsters decision. But see, Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374,
1389 (5th Cir. 1978) (without citing Teamsters, the court evaluated the seniority system under
the business necessity test). Pre-Teamsters decisions evaluating seniority systems under the
business necessity test have held thm to a high standard. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermaker &Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.. 919
(1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). But see White v.
Carolina Paperboard Corp., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 7843 (4th Cir. 1977).
12. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
13. Id. at 517-18. The district court therefore held the seniority system was not entitled
to § 703(h) protection.
14. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers 8=Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Joseph, Last Hired, FirstFired Seniority,
Layoffs, and Title VII: Questions of Liability and Remedy, 11 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PaoBs. 343
(1975).
15. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 US. 553 (1977). In Evans, a female flight
attendant was discriminatorily discharged in 1968. When she was rehired in 1972 she did not
receive retroactive seniority. The court initially noted that her claim for discriminatory discharge was barred by the statute of limitations. Then, after recognizing that a seniority
system could lock in the effect of a prior act of discrimination, the Court rejected her perpetuation theory claim.
16. Id. at 560.
17. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977).
Teamsters effectively limited Evans to its facts, which involved the perpetuation of post-Act
discrimination as opposed to pre-Act discrimination. 431 U.S. at 348 n.30. Cf. Baker, Title VII
in the Supreme Court: Equal Employment Opportunity Bows to Seniority Rights, 1978
UTAH L. Rav. 249, 255-57.
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Breadth of Section 703(h) Immunity: Preand Post-Act Discrimination
Assuming plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that a seniority system
violated Title VII, the plaintiff must still overcome the immunity accorded
to bona fide seniority systems by section 703(h) of Title VII. This provision
immunizes nonuniform employment practices that may have a discriminatory
effect, provided such practices are "pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system ... [and] not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ..... 1.
In Quarles, the district court ruled that the seniority system was not bona
fide under section 703(h) because it had "its genesis in racial discrimination"'1
and perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination. 20 Later cases went even
further, ruling that continuing the effects of prior discrimination, by itself,
would render a seniority system not bona fide. 21 Despite the apparent protection of section 703(h), virtually any seniority system was open to attack.
The Supreme Court resolved the confusion in the landmark opinion,
InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. United States.2 2 The Court expressed
2
concern that the perpetuation theory would "disembowel" section 703(h). 3
The Court recognized that a seniority system perpetuating the effects of past
discrimination was prima facie violative of Title VII; however, it rejected the
theory that a seniority system was not bona fide "under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. "24 Although Teamsters rejected the accepted basis for finding seniority systems unprotected by section
703(h), the Court did not hold that all seniority systems were immune from
attack under Title VII.25 A seniority system must be bona fide to gain the
statutory immunity. Moreover, "any differences in treatment [must] not be
'the result of an intention to discriminate because of race ....

,26

The Teamsters opinion demonstrates the Court's intent to construe section
703(h) broadly. Although Teamsters only involved pre-Act discrimination, the
Court carefully noted that section 703(h) protects seniority systems perpetuating
both pre-Act and post-Act discrimination.2 7 Likewise, although Teamsters involved a departmental seniority system, the Court specifically stated no pre-

18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
19. 279 F. Supp. at 517.
20. Id. at 518.
21. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
22. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
23. Id. at 353.
24. Id. at 353-54. A bona fide seniority system is a defense to a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976). Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 673 F.2d 742, 754 n.18 (5th Cir. 1982);
Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1978); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 ]-.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
25. 431 U.S. at 353.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 348 n.30.
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ference was to be accorded one type of seniority system over another.28 These
statements strongly suggest the decision should not be narrowed to its facts.
Despite the Court's broad construction of section 703(h), the Fourth Circuit
recently attempted to limit Teamsters in Patterson v. American Tobacco Co. 29
The company and the union had agreed to new lines of progression requiring
employees to work in a lower job before becoming eligible for the next higher
job. Of the nine lines of progression, six were divided largely on racial grounds
and were held to violate Title VII. The district court found the lines of progression were not bona fide under Teamsters.3 0 The Fourth Circuit initially
held Teamsters inapplicable because the lines of progression were not a
seniority system.31 In a rehearing en banc, the court retreated somewhat by
holding additional facts were needed to properly determine if the progressive
lines were a bona fide seniority system under Teamsters.3 2 Nevertheless, the
Fourth Circuit limited Teamsters to its apparent facts in a ruling based on the
legislative history that section 703(h) was inapplicable to seniority systems developed after Title VII's effective date.33
On certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's attempt to
narrow 703(h)'s immunization of seniority systems.3 4 The Court reviewed legislative history3 and found it inconclusive.3s By interpreting section 703(h)
literally, the Court held it applied to all bona fide seniority systems, whether
3
created before or after the Act. 7
What Is a Seniority System?
Although Patterson reaffirmed the breadth of section 703(h) immunity, it
focused on another element of 703(h) protection: what employer practices
constitute a seniority system. Section 703(h) can only be invoked if the system
under attack is a seniority system. Pattersonwas remanded for a determination
of whether the lines of progression constituted a seniority system within the
meaning of 703(h).38
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in CaliforniaBrewers As28. Id. at 355 n.41. The Court found support in Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature
and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HAv. L. Rav. 1532, 1534 (1962); Cooper & Sobol,
Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective
Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. Rxv. 1598, 1602 (1969)).

29. 634 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1980), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982).
30. 102 S. Ct. at 1536.
31. 586 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1978).
32. 634 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1980).
33. Id. at 749. The Fourth Circuit assumed that Teamsters involved a seniority system
adopted before Title VII was passed. The facts, however, do not clearly support this
conclusion. 102 S. Ct. at 1541 n.16.
34. 102 S. Ct. at 1538-39.
35. The legislative history of § 703(h) has been analyzed extensively by the Supreme
Court in several cases. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 Us.
324, 350, 353 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
36. 102 S. Ct. at 1539-40.
37. Id. at 1541-42.
38. Id. at 1542 n.18.
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9
sociation v. Bryant.3
In Bryant, a black temporary employee brought a class
action against the California Brewers Association, several California brewing
companies, and unions, alleging discrimination as a result of seniority provisions in a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement. The provisions
required temporary employees to work forty-five weeks in the industry, during
a single calendar year, before they could obtain permanent employment status.
The employees' rights with respect to hiring, layoff and other employment
matters largely depended on their status as permanent or temporary employees. It was alleged each employer discriminated against blacks in the
past and this historical discrimination was perpetuated by the forty-five-week

rule.

40

The court of appeals held the forty-five-week rule was not a seniority system
within section 703(h) because it lacked "the concept that employment rights
should increase as the length of an employee's service increases." 4' The court
considered this a "fundamental component" of any seniority system. 42 Under
the forty-five-week rule, an employee could acquire permanent status after
only forty-five weeks of work, if done in one calendar year, whereas others
might work for years and never attain permanent status because they were
43
always discharged just before finishing forty-five work weeks in one year.
The Supreme Court reversed, initially noting that Title VII failed to define
"seniority system" and section 703(h)'s legislative history provided no comprehensive definition. 4 4 It then turned to the commonly accepted notions of
"seniority" and "systems," and defined a "seniority system" as:
[A] scheme that, alone or in tandem with non-"seniority" criteria, allots
to employees ever improving employment rights and benefits as their
relative lengths of pertinent employment increase ....
[T]he principle
feature of any and every "seniority system" is that preferential treatment
is dispensed
on the basis of some measure of time served in employ4

ment. 5

Utilizing this definition, the Court concluded that the forty-five week provision conformed with "core concepts of 'seniority.' "46
Responding to the circuit court's ruling that the forty-five-week provision
was not a seniority system, the Court declared that because section 703(h)
governed "systems," it should not be limited to provisions effectuating "the

39. 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
40. Id. at 601-02.
41.

634 F.2d at 744.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 444 U.S. at 605.
45. Id. at 605-06. Although Bryant involved a collective bargaining agreement, the
definition of a seniority system should be equally applicable to a unilaterally adopted system.
See Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 673 F.2d 742, 754 n.19 (5th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 445 F. Supp. 223, 248 (D. Del. 1978); Malinowski, The Teamsters
703(h) Exemption: Does It Apply to Nonunion Employers?, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 210 (1981).
46. 444 U.S. at 606.
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principle that length of employment will be rewarded." 47 The Court sanctioned
ancillary rules which determine when seniority begins to accrue,48 when it is
forfeited4 9 what periods of employment count toward seniority50 and what
benefits accrue with seniority.51 The Court further sanctioned dual seniority
tracks within a seniority system. 52 In an attempt to preclude limiting the
holding, the Court noted that this was not an exhaustive list,53 and that seniority
systems "inevitably come in all sizes and shapes."'5 4
Despite this broad definition, the Court cautioned that merely dubbing a
rule part of a seniority system would not bring it within the scope of section
708(h).5 5 For example, an educational prerequisite to a seniority system would
not be protected. 58 Moreover, aptitude or physical tests, or standards based on
subjectivity are not immune simply because they are incorporated into a
seniority system.5 7 The forty-five-week rule served "the needed function of establishing the threshold requirement for entry into the permanent employee
seniority track."58s The Court recognized the inherent difficulties in working
forty-five weeks within a given year, but concluded that these difficulties were
present in any seniority system and did not render the system invalid under
703(h). 9
Bryant dearly establishes that the term "seniority system" is to be broadly
construed. Any scheme allocating employee benefits on the basis of time in employment is a seniority system within 703(h). If part of a seniority system is
47. Id. at 606-07.
48. Id. at 607 n.17. The Court gave the following example:

(A] collective bargaining agreement could specify that an employee begins to accumulate
seniority rights at the time he commences employment with the company, at the time
he commences employment within the industry, at the time he begins performing a

particular job function, or only after a probationary period of employment.
Id.

49. Id. at 607 n.18. The Court gave the following example: "[An] agreement could provide that accumulated seniority rights are permanently forfeited by voluntary resignation, by
severance for cause, or by nonemployment at a particular plant or in the industry for a
certain period." Id.
50. Id. at 607 n.19. The Court illustrated as follows: "Mhe time an employee works

in the industry or with his current employer might not be counted for the purpose of
accumulating seniority rights, whereas the time the employee works in a particular job
classification might determine his seniority." Id.

51. Id. at 607 n.20. The Court gave the following example: "[An] agreement could provide that an employee's seniority will govern his entitlement to vacation time and his job
security in the event of layoffs, but will have no influence on promotions or job assignments."
Id.

52. Id. at 609.
53. Id. at 608 n.21.
54. Id. at 608.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 609.
57. Id. at 609-10.
58. Id. at 609. The Court ;.dditionally noted that the rule focused on rewarding employment longevity. Id.
59. Id. at 610.
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invalid, the entire system need not be invalidated. Instead, the defective
portion should be evaluated under Title VII apart from the core seniority
60
system's provisions which are protected by section 703(h).
BONA FIDE SENIORITY SYSTEMS

Bryant establishes that seniority systems are to be granted immunity from
Title VII's broad ban on employment discrimination; however, it also cautions
that all seniority systems are: not so protected. Only bona fide seniority systems
are granted immunity by section 703(h). The Bryant Court remanded for a
determination of whether the system was bona fide or "the differences in employment conditions that it ...

produced [were] 'the result of an intention to

discriminate because of race.' "61 As explained below, these apparently alternative determinations are actually one and the same.
Unlike the term "seniority system" the Supreme Court has never explicitly
defined "bona fide." The Supreme Court has stated that "actual intent to discriminate must be proved . . . to invalidate [a] system,"6 2 and that "any

challenge to a seniority system under Title VII will require a trial on the issue
of discriminatory intent: Was the system adopted because of its racially discriminatory impact?" 3 Absent proof of such discriminatory intent, a seniority
64
system is lawful even if it has some discriminatory consequences.
Relying on the Supreme Court's evaluation of the seniority system in
6
Teamsters, the Fifth Circuit, in James v. Stockholm Valves & Fitting Co., ,
concluded that a seniority system was not bona fide if there had been "purposeful discrimination in connection with [its] establishment or continuation.''66
To assist in determining if a system was non-bona fide, the Fifth Circuit
identified four factors the Supreme Court emphasized in Teamstsers.
(1) [WVhether the seniority system operates to discourage all employees
equally from transferring between seniority units;
(2) whether the seniority units are in the same or separate bargaining
units (if the latter, whether that structure is rational and in conformance
with industry practice);
(3) whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrimination;
and
(4) whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained free from
any illegal purpose. 67
The James court suggested that all seniority systems should be evaluated
against these factors to determine whether they were bona fide. This approach
has since been used extensively in the Fifth Circuit, 68 and has been expressly
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 606 n.13.
Id. at 610-11.
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 102 S. Ct. 1534, 1535 (1982).

63.

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1784 (1982).

64.

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardinson, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1976).

65. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
66. Id. at 351.
67. Id.
68. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 102
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sanctioned in the Sixth69 and Tenth Circuits70 as well as by the Supreme
Court77

The First Factor:

Discouraging Transfer
The first factor concerns the effect of seniority systems in practice. In

Teamsters, the Supreme Court faced a departmental seniority system perpetuating the effects of past intentional discrimination. The prior discrimination involved hiring only white drivers as line drivers and requiring all blacks

to accept non-line-driver jobs, although a majority of the non-line-driver jobs
were held by white drivers. The line-driver jobs were lower paying and less
desirable. The seniority system perpetuated the effects of this past discrimination by requiring a driver who later transferred to a line-driver job to forfeit
all accumulated competitive seniority. Thus, non-line drivers were effectively
"locked" into the less desirable jobs.72 In holding the seniority system bona

fide, the Supreme Court looked beyond the system's facial neutrality, stating
that "drivers . . . who are discouraged from transferring to line-driver jobs
are not all Negroes or Spanish-surnamed Americans; to the contrary, the overwhelming majority are white."73 This observation by the Court indicates that
the racial composition of the disadvantaged unit must be considered, and if it

disproportionately impacts a protected class, the system may not be bona fide.
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have recently utilized the disparate impact
4
Co.,7 the Tenth
Circuit examined a system in which seniority was based on an employee's time
of service within a particular craft. As in Teamsters, the Sears seniority system

approach. In Sears v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway

discouraged employees from transferring from one craft to another. In Sears,
however, the positions of porter and chair car attendant were the lowest
paying, least desirable separate craft jobs and had been filled solely by blacks.75
The court rejected the lower court's conclusion that facial neutrality satisfied
the first factor.70 Instead, the court cited Teamsters' emphasis on the racial

composition of the disadvantaged group and, noting the employees discouraged
S. Ct. 1781 (1982); Terrell v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 634 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981).
69. Taylor v. Mueller Co., 660 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1981). The Teamsters factors as outlined by James have also been implicitly accepted by the Fourth Circuit. See Younger v.
Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 21 Emp1. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,406 (W.D. Va. 1979), aff'd
per curiam, 621 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1980).
70. Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981).
71. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (1982). Although the Supreme Court
approved of the four factors approach, it cautioned that these factors were not exhaustive.
Id. at 1785 n.8. See Terrell v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir.
1981) (where the court considered factors in addition to those isolated by James); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
72. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337-38.
73. Id. at 356.
74. 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981).
75. Id. at 1369.
76. Id. at 1372.
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from transferring were exclusively black, held the seniority system failed the
first Teamsters criterion77
The Fifth Circuit has addressed this specific issue three times. In Swint v.
Pullman-Standard78 the appellate court rejected the district court's finding
that the first factor had been complied with simply because the system equally
locked both black and white employees into a particular department. It was
clear in dictum that if less desirable departments were disproportionately
black, the first Teamsters factor would not be met.79 Shortly thereafter, in
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 0 the Fifth Circuit specifically held a
seniority system did not meet the first Teamsters factor if the least desirable
jobs were filled overwhelmingly by blacks, and the seniority system tended to
lock them in their positions. 31 The third time the court addressed this issue it
ruled that when the seniority system disparately locked black employees into
lower paying, less desirable jobs, the system "conclusively" failed the first
Teamsters criterion.82
Not all courts have followed the lead of the Tenth and Fifth Circuits. The
Sixth Circuit held valid a facially neutral seniority system which locked employees into intentionally segregated departments, with the black employees
in the lower paying jobs. s3 The system was bona fide under Teamsters because
it was facially neutral and "locked" in both white and black employees.8 4 The
court specifically stated that "[t]he fact that the black employees were locked
into lower job classifications than their white fellow employees is not sufficient
to deprive the system of its section 703(h) immunity."' 5
Inasmuch as the Teamsters factors are merely guides for determining
whether a seniority system was developed or maintained with an intent to
discriminate, the Sixth Circuit's application of the first factor is incomplete. In
Teamsters, the Court held a system should not be ruled non-bona fide solely
because it perpetuated the effects of past discrimination; intentional discrimination must be shown. Disparate impact, however, was never ruled out as
an indicator of an intent to discriminate."6 Thus, a facially neutral system that
locks all employees into their jobs could have been the result of an intent to
lock the white employees into the higher paying jobs and the black employees
into the lower paying jobs. To the extent the system had this effect on a dis77. Id. at 1373.
78. 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S.Ct. 1781 (1982).
79. 624 F.2d at 531.
80. 634 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 935.
82. See Terrell v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1981).
83. See Taylor v. Mueller, 660 F.2d 1116, 1122 (6th Cir. 1981).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra text accompanying note 78. In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 580 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that racial balance or imbalance "is not wholly
irrelevant in the issue of intent when the issue is yet to be decided." Recently, in PullmanStandard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1790 (1982), the Supreme Court cited Furnco for the
proposition that discriminatory impact is "part of the evidence to be considered by the trial
court in reaching a finding on whether there was . . a discriminatory intent .. " Id.
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proportionate basis, it may evidence intent to discriminate5s Other evidence
would also be probative of discriminatory intent.88 On the other hand, the
same facially neutral system locking all employees into their present jobs on a
proportionate basis could be equally probative of non-discriminatory intent.
The entire effect of the system must be examined to determine whether it is
bona fide.
Caution must be taken not to over emphasize the disparate impact of the
seniority system. 9 Examining all of the circumstances may lead to the conclusion that the disparate impact is solely the result of prior discrimination by
the employer. A seniority system may disproportionately lock protected employees into lower paying jobs, because the employer had required segregation
of his employees by craft or job in the past. If the seniority system was properly
structured along these craft or, job classifications, a "lock in" effect would
automatically have greater negative impact on protected employees. This
would not necessarily be the result of an intent to discriminate; rather, it
would be the result of prior discrimination. Perpetuation of the effects of past
discrimination is precisely what Teamsters held would not render a seniority
system non-bona fide.
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits may have gone too far by holding a seniority
system conclusively fails the first Teamsters factor because the seniority system
disproportionately locks protected employees in the least desirable jobs. 0 This
effect may be equally indicative of either an intent to discriminate or the
result of prior discrimination. 91 Full and proper application of the Teamsters
factors requires analysis of the facts as they relate to an intent to discriminate.
87. A disproportionate impact could also indicate perpetuation of the employer's prior
discrimination, not the system's intentional discrimination. Thus, other factors would have
to be considered to fully evaluate the inference to be drawn from a discriminatory impact.
88. For example, the fact that the seniority system was not structured in accordance with
industry practice or NLRB precedents and was otherwise irrational, combined with a disproportionate number of blacks being locked into the lower-paying jobs, would strengthen
an inference that the system was developed with an intent to discriminate.
89. Cf. Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), which stated that
"statistical differences must be discounted to the extent they are simply a reflection of the
impact of the bona fide seniority system.... " Id. at 1382.
90. The Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have not yet relied on any one factor
in finding a seniority system non-bona fide. Indeed, in every case rejecting a seniority system
as non-bona fide, the system did not pass muster under any of the four factors. See, e.g., Sears
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 645 F.2d 1365, 1372-74 (10th Cir. 1981) (affirming
the district court's finding that the seniority system was non-bona fide only after finding the
system did not meet any of the Teamsters factors, where the district court had found failure
of the last two factors); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 634 F.2d 929, 935 (5th Cir. 1981)
(skirting the issue of how many factors were needed to find a system non-bona fide by finding
that the seniority system therein did not pass muster under any of them). But see Chrapliwy
v. Uniroyal Inc., 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CC) ff7933 at 6662 (ND. Ind. 1977) (finding the
seniority system in a sex discrimination case non-bona fide because it did not pass muster
under the third and fourth Teamsters factors).
91. Although the Fifth and Tenth Circuits did not find the seniority systems under
review non-bona fide solely because the systems did not pass muster under the first Teamsters
factor, their reliance on this fact, absent a thorough analysis of what inference should be
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The Second Factor:Separate
Bargaining Unit Structure
The seniority system in Teamsters involved separate bargaining units. The
units were structured on a rational basis in accordance with industry practice
and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedents, 92 which supported
the conclusion the system was bona fide. As might be expected, courts applying
the second Teamsters factor have evaluated industry practices and relied on
NLRB precedents. 93 However, the Tenth Circuit in Sears concluded that the
creation of the porter and chair car attendants as a separate craft was not
rational because it was drawn totally on racial lines. 94 Moreover, other crafts
performed the same function as the porter and chair car attendant, thereby
undercutting the rationality of the separate craft units.
To the extent the Tenth Circuit relied upon the racial composition of
craft units to conclude the seniority system did not satisfy the second Teamsters
factor, its reliance was misplaced. If industry practice and NLRB precedents
supported a particular division of craft units, the mere fact that an employer
discriminatorily placed black employees into certain jobs is not indicative of
discriminatory purpose in establishing the seniority system. Instead, it discloses discriminatory intent in hiring or job placement. The Teamsters factors
must not be evaluated in a vacuum; they should be used to assist a determination of whether the seniority system under review had its beginning or was
maintained with a discriminatory purpose. Evaluation of the effect of a seniority
system without considering the underlying cause, renders suspect any conclusion
that the facts show discriminatory intent.
The Third Factor: Genesis in
Racial Discrimination
The parties in Teamsters stipulated that the seniority system did not have
drawn therefrom, weakens their conclusions. In each case decided to date, the seniority
system under review has not passed evaluation under any of the Teamsters factors. See supra
note 90. Thus, the Fifth and Tenth Circuit decisions have ultimately rested upon a finding of
purposeful discrimination. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text, discussing the
fourth factor as requiring a specific focus on discriminatory intent in maintaining the
seniority system. If such intent is present, then the system is not bona fide.
92. 431 U.S. at 356.
93. Id. at 356 nA2. See also, Taylor v. Mueller Co., 660 F.2d 1116, 1122 (6th Cir. 1981).
Although this is clearly a factual determination, the Fifth Circuit has found it easy to reject
district court findings that the seniority system comported with industry practice and NLRB
practice. Terrell v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1981);

Swint, 624 F.2d 525, 531 (5th Cir. 1980). However, Swint was reversed by the Supreme Court
because the Court found that the appellate court misapplied the "clearly erroneous" rule in
reviewing district court fact-finding. 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1792 (1982).
94. The court stated, "we believe the creation of the porter and chair car attendant
crafts was not rational because they were drawn along racial lines." 645 F.2d at 1373. The
Sears court thoroughly rejected the district court's findings that the seniority system was in
accord with industry practice, NLRB precedents and was otherwise rational. Such rejections
are inappropriate unless they are based on the lower court's clearly erroneous findings.
See supra note 93.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss1/2

12

Kasold: Toward a Definition of the Bona Fide Seniority System

1983]

BONA FIDE SENIORITY SYSTEM

its genesis in racial discrimination. 95 Consequently, the Supreme Court never
isolated the factors that would be determinative of such a finding. The Tenth
Circuit has subsequently held that a seniority system had its genesis in racial
discrimination because it was created when segregation was the standard
operating procedure. No specific link between discriminatory intent and the
creation of the seniority system was required. 96 The Fifth Circuit apparently
adopts this approach, holding in Georgia Power that a seniority system did
not pass muster under the third Teamsters factor because it had its genesis in
an era of overt racial discrimination.97 This expansive view of the genesis
factor has been rejected by the Sixth Circuit.98 That court instead requires
intent to discriminate in the " 'very adoption'" of the seniority system, not
in the general racial attitude of the time. 9
Inferring a discriminatory genesis from the general racial attitude of the
period, as the Tenth and Fifth Circuits do, effectively circumvents real application of the third Teamsters factor. Finding that a seniority system had its
beginnings in an era of general racial discrimination should have little, if
any, probative value for the conclusion that a particular system was the
product of discrimination. 100 There should be a nexus between the seniority
system's development and discriminatory intent and, to the extent that nexus
is lacking, a conclusion that the system had its genesis in racial discrimination
is not supportive of holding a seniority system not bona fide.
The FourthFactor:
Illegal Purpose
The seniority system in Teamsters had been negotiated and maintained
free from any illegal purpose. 01' This factor has been interpreted to require
analysis of the seniority system in practice for discrimination against members
of a protected class. In Sears, the Tenth Circuit held the seniority system was
maintained with a discriminatory purpose because the union actively sought
transfer of certain duties from black employees to white employees.102 Moreover, black employees were not allowed to join the white employee union.' 03
In Georgia Power, the Fifth Circuit found the seniority system was illegally
maintained because there were separate systems for those job classifications
which were comprised of only black employees, while recently improved
seniority provisions were only ensured for those previously all black classifications which had been integrated. 0 4 This inequitable treatment was clearly the
result of purposeful discrimination. This application of the fourth Teamsters
95.
96.
97.
98.

431 U.S. at 356.
Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 645 F.2d 1365, 1373-74 (10th Cir. 1981).
634 F.2d 929, 936 (5th Cir. 1981).
660 F.2d at 1122-23.

99. Id. at 1123.

100.
101.
---102.
103.
104.

Weiner, Seniority Systems in the Post-Teamsters Era, 30 LAB. L.J. 545, 549 (1979).
This was stipulated by the parties. 431 U.S. at 356.
645-F.2d at 1374.
Id.
634 F.2d at 936.
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factor is proper since the focus is on actual discriminatory practices, precisely
the evil that the Supreme Court held renders seniority systems non-bona fide.105
One, Some, or All Factors
The third and fourth factors, genesis in racial discrimination and illegal
purpose, appear to be sufficient to render a seniority system not bona fide under
Title VII, to the extent they focus on the actual intent to discriminate in the
creation of the seniority system. If purposeful discrimination in the development or the maintenance of a seniority system is proven, then the system is
clearly not protected by section 703(h). The third and fourth factors are more
useful in identifying a non-bona fide system than they are helpful in system
evaluation.
On the other hand, the first and second factors, discouraging transfer and
separate bargaining units, as well as the third factor to the extent it focuses
on the racial attitude of the era in which the seniority system was developed,
are only indications that the system is non-bona fide. Taken together, they
might lead to the conclusion that the system was developed or maintained with
a discriminatory purpose. Standing alone, however, they could not be so construed. Consequently, a seniority system developed in an era of racial discrimination, not structured along lines within industry practice or NLRB
precedents, and disproportionately impacting upon minority workers by locking only them into the lower paying jobs could properly be determined to be
the result of an intent to discriminate. By contrast, a system structured in
accordance with industry practice and NLRB precedent probably is not nonbona fide solely because it was developed in an era of racial discrimination and
has a disproportionate effect on employees in a protected class.1 0 The nexus
between disparate impact and discriminatory intent is lacking. Disparate
impact alone does not necessarily mean discriminatory intent; it could simply
be the result of prior discrimination which is not enough to invalidate a
seniority system.
CONCLUSION

Since the Teamsters decision, the Supreme Court has strengthened its
holding that section 703(h) provides broad immunity to bona fide seniority
systems. It is clear that section 703(h) protects both pre-Act and post-Act
seniority systems. The term "seniority system" refers to any scheme allocating
employee benefits on the basis of time in employment, including schemes
relying on dual seniority tracks, such as departmental systems. Section 703(h)
protects those seniority system components establishing the method of computing seniority or determining what benefits accrue with seniority. If the
system has provisions going beyond these parameters that are not immunized
by section 703(h), such as educational requirements to accrue seniority, the
entire system is not invalidated. Instead, the unprotected provision is evaluated
under Title VII apart from the rest of the system.
105.
106.

International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365-68 (1977).
Obviously, other evidence might support a conclusion the system was non-bona fide.
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55

The only viable basis upon which to attack a seniority system is that it is
not bona fide. This requires a showing of actual intent to discriminate in the
development or maintenance of the seniority system. Such intent cannot be
inferred solely from a discriminatory impact upon minority employees; but,
rather, the totality of the circumstances must demonstrate an actual discriminatory motive. The Teamsters factors are helpful in evaluating whether
discriminatory motive exists or existed, but the facts must not be considered
perfunctorily; they are useful only if evaluated in relation to the intent, if
any, which may be inferred from them.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

15

